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ABSTRACT
Background About half of all US states have cigarette
minimum price laws (MPLs) that require a per cent
mark-up on prices, but research suggests they may not
be very effective in raising prices. An alternative type of
MPL sets a floor price below which packs cannot be
sold, and may be more promising. This new type of MPL
policy has only been implemented in 1 city, therefore its
benefits relative to excise taxes is difficult to assess.
Methods We constructed a set of possible state floor
price MPL options, and matched them to possible state
excise tax hikes designed to produce similar average
price increases. Using self-reported price and cigarette
consumption data from 23 521 participants in the
2010–2011 Tobacco Use Supplement of the Current
Population Survey, we projected changes in pack prices
and cigarette consumption following implementation of
each paired MPL and tax option, for lower and higher
income groups.
Results We project that state MPLs set at the average
reported pack price would raise prices by $0.33 and
reduce cigarette consumption by about 4%; a tax with a
similar average price effect would reduce consumption
by 2.3%. MPLs and taxes that raise average prices by
more than $2.00 would reduce consumption by 15.9%
and 13.5%, respectively. In all models, we project that
MPLs will reduce income-based smoking disparities more
than their comparable excise taxes.
Conclusions Floor price cigarette MPLs set at or above
what consumers currently report paying could reduce
both tobacco use and socioeconomic disparities in
smoking.
Nearly one in six US adults are current cigarette
smokers,1 and prevalence is much higher among
individuals with low incomes. In 2014, 26.3% of
adults living below the federal poverty level
smoked, in comparison to only 15.2% of those
living at or above it.1 Increasing the price of
tobacco products is one of the most effective strat-
egies for reducing tobacco use,2 3 and two reviews
indicate it shows promise for decreasing socio-
economic disparities.4 5
Cigarette prices have typically been raised in the
USA through excise taxes, but recently some states
and cities are exploring non-tax price-related pol-
icies.6 7 One approach is a minimum price law
(MPL), which sets a minimum price below which it
is illegal to sell a specific product. Many MPLs
work by requiring per cent mark-ups on retail or
manufacturer prices, but evidence of their effective-
ness is limited, likely because current mark-ups are
small, and many MPLs permit the use of price
promotions to undercut the minimum price
level.8 9 Public health and legal officials recently
recommended a style of MPL that sets a single
floor price below which cigarettes cannot be sold.10
A floor price MPL was implemented in New York
City in 2014, and Chicago may implement a
similar policy soon.
Excise taxes and floor price MPLs differ in how
they are designed to raise tobacco prices. Whereas
most cigarette excise taxes in the USA levy a spe-
cific price hike across the market, floor price MPLs
are structured to raise prices particularly on
cheaper products. For instance, a 50-cent tax hike
applies to a $4.00 discount pack and a $7.00
premium brand. In contrast, a $5.50 MPL should
raise the price by $1.50 on the discount pack but
not alter the premium brand price. As a result,
floor price MPLs may have a stronger impact on
individuals who smoke discount cigarette brands or
use coupons to reduce the price they pay. Greater
use of several price minimisation strategies has been
documented among low-income smokers.11–13
In this study, we test the hypothesis that floor
price MPLs may be more effective than excise taxes
at reducing tobacco consumption, especially among
lower income smokers, by conducting a counterfac-
tual simulation. We construct four pairs of potential
state-specific MPL floor prices and excise taxes
structured to raise average prices by the same
amount. Using nationally representative smoking
and self-reported cigarette price data, and previous
research about price responsiveness of smokers,14–18
we project the impacts of implementing each policy
on prices and consumption, among all smokers, and
then among higher income and lower income
smokers separately.
METHODS
Sample
Our estimates of smoking behaviour and cigarette
prices prior to simulated policy implementation
derive from adult participants in the 2010–2011
Tobacco Use Supplement (TUS) of the Current
Population Survey, a national survey that is spon-
sored by the National Cancer Institute and adminis-
tered by the US Census Bureau.19 We excluded
58 091 proxy respondents who were not eligible to
be asked all TUS questions, and an additional 896
respondents with missing smoking status data,
resulting in a sample of 170 469 respondents.
Of the 170 469 eligible participants, 27 611
(16.2%) reported being current smokers, and
23 730 had complete data on consumption and
price paid for the last pack of cigarettes.
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We excluded 206 individuals who reported paying extremely
high (>$25) or low (<$1) cigarette prices, leaving us with a
final sample of 23 524.
Measures
Smoking status
Individuals were considered smokers if they reported having
smoked at least 100 cigarettes in their lifetime, and currently
smoking every day or some days.
Consumption
Using TUS smoker reports of the number of days that they
smoke and the number of cigarettes they consume per smoking
day, we calculated monthly consumption for each smoker, and
divided it by 30 to create a daily consumption variable. If non-
daily smokers failed to indicate how many days they smoked,
we assumed 14.5 out of 30, based on previous research.20 21
Household income
To create an approximate measure of whether an individual
lives in a household below or above the 2010 median income
level of $50 046,22 we categorised everyone who reported
incomes of $50 000–$59 999 or more as higher income and
everyone who reported incomes as $40 000–$49 999 or less as
lower income.
Self-reported prices paid for a pack of cigarettes
TUS smokers indicated the price they paid for their last pack or
carton of cigarettes, after using discounts. If the self-reported
price was for a carton, we divided it by 10 to get a per pack
price.
Analysis
Constructing MPL and tax counterfactuals
We first constructed four state-specific MPL floor options that
corresponded to 75%, 100%, 125% and 150% of the mean
price levels reported by participants buying in each state. To
construct corresponding state-specific tax hike levels, we calcu-
lated the average price increase we would expect from each
MPL using the process to project price changes described below,
assuming no evasion, and set the tax hike amounts at these
averages.
Projecting changes in cigarette pack prices
For each potential policy, we projected a new cigarette pack
price for each sample member. The extent of illicit tobacco
trade in the USA varies by state and region, but a recent national
report estimates that between 8.5% and 21% of US cigarette
sales are illicit.23 Averaging these, we drew a random sample of
15% of respondents and assumed they would evade new price
policies and continue to pay their previously self-reported price.
We also assumed that anyone who reported buying on an Indian
reservation would continue to do so, evading the new law and
paying their previous price. Projected prices for MPLs were set
at the purchase state floor price level for all non-evading respon-
dents who initially reported paying less than the floor price, and
at the respondent’s self-reported paid price for everyone who
reported paying the new MPL floor price amount or more.
Projected prices for excise taxes were determined by adding the
tax hike amount to the self-reported price for all non-evading
respondents. To examine whether our results were affected by
variation in random sampling of evaders, we repeated this
process 10 times. Each produced the same consumption esti-
mates once rounded.
Simulating changes in cigarette consumption
We simulated our projections of cigarette consumption follow-
ing an increase in cigarette prices using previous research on cig-
arette price elasticity, a measure of the change in quantity of
product consumed following a change in price. Previous reviews
converge on a consensus elasticity estimate of −0.4,15 16 but
some recent studies have documented smaller elasticities.14 17 18
We ran one set of models assuming a more conservative elasti-
city estimate than the consensus (−0.3). There is also discrep-
ancy in previous literature about whether price responsiveness
varies by income level. Elasticities from US-based studies range
from −0.29 to −0.43 for low-income smokers, and from −0.10
to −0.22 for high-income smokers.24–26 We therefore ran each
of our models again, using differential elasticities (ehigh income=
−0.15; elow income=−0.35) that were within this range and that
produced a weighted average across the sample of approxi-
mately −0.3. We report projected estimates of daily cigarette
consumption per population of smokers in the TUS, which
comprise changes due to quitting and reduced consumption
among continuing smokers.
Estimating the impact of MPLs and taxes on socioeconomic
disparities in smoking
We stratified our results to estimate the price and consumption
effects of each policy separately for the TUS populations in
lower (<$50 000) and higher (≥$50 000) household income
categories.
RESULTS
Smoking and prices
Nearly 21% of respondents with household incomes below
$50 000 per year reported smoking at baseline, compared with
11% of higher income respondents (table 1). Lower income
smokers also smoked more frequently, and consumed 0.38
cigarettes more per day (13.34 vs 12.96). The average self-
reported prices were $5.20 overall, and were $5.42 and $5.10
among higher and lower income smokers, respectively.
State MPL floor price levels and tax amounts
State-specific MPL floor prices and tax hike amounts designed
to produce the same average price increases in the absence of
evasion are provided in table 2. In Missouri, where purchasers
reported paying the least for a pack of cigarettes (state mean=
$3.50), we constructed MPL levels ranging from $2.63 (75% of
mean) to $5.25 (150% of mean), and tax increases ranging
from $0.10 to $1.77. In New York, where respondents reported
the highest prices (state mean=$7.21), we constructed MPL
levels from $5.41 to $10.81, and tax increases from $0.71 to
$3.73.
Projected price changes
For each MPL and tax option, we calculated absolute price
changes using the difference between respondents’ self-reported
prices and the projected new prices, and also calculated relative
price increases based on the per cent increase in price each
respondent would experience. Average absolute price changes
for each policy option are listed on the horizontal axis of
figure 1, and the corresponding average relative price increase
for each policy, by income group, is charted on the vertical axis.
The four MPL counterfactuals are projected to raise absolute
prices by $0.07, $0.35, $1.07 and $2.08, on average. Price
changes projected for the corresponding taxes were very similar
($0.09, $0.36, $1.12, $2.13). The slightly higher price increases
Golden SD, et al. Tob Control 2016;25:i60–i66. doi:10.1136/tobaccocontrol-2016-053230 i61
Research paper
under the tax result from evaders saving less by avoiding the tax
than by avoiding the MPL. From an original self-reported price
of $5.20, the MPLs and taxes we simulated are therefore pro-
jected to produce new average prices ranging from $5.27 to
$7.33.
Relative price increases range from 4.2% to 51.3% for lower
income smokers as the MPL level rises. Among higher income
smokers, these same MPLs produce relative price increases of
only 2.2–43.8%. Relative price increases for taxes are similar
for both income groups, and closely approximate what is
observed for higher income smokers with an MPL.
Projected consumption changes
We next calculated changes in consumption derived from the
relative price increases consumers are projected to experience.
Estimates of changes in consumption for the entire population
do not differ substantially under the two price sensitivity scen-
arios we considered, so we report results for the models that
assume a consistent elasticity of −0.3. As MPLs increase across
the four options, we predict that per capita daily consumption
would drop from 13.2 cigarettes to 13.0, 12.7, 12.0 and 11.1
cigarettes. The corresponding tax policies are projected to
produce consumption levels of 13.1, 12.9, 12.3 and 11.4 cigar-
ettes, respectively. Put in relative terms, we project that an MPL
that raises average prices by $0.33 would reduce consumption
by nearly 4%, whereas the $0.37 tax increase only reduces con-
sumption by 2.3%. Larger average price increases of more than
$2.00 are projected to result in a 15.9% drop in consumption
for an MPL, and 13.5% for a tax.
Figure 2 contains two panels that chart projected changes in
per capita cigarette consumption by income group. Both MPLs
and taxes are projected to reduce income-based disparities in
consumption among TUS smokers, but gaps shrink more for
MPLs than for taxes. In the TUS, daily consumption averages
were 0.38 cigarettes more among lower income smokers than
higher income smokers. Under assumptions of consistent price
sensitivity (panel A), we predict that this gap shrinks to 0.15
cigarettes when MPLs raise prices by $0.33, but only to 0.35
cigarettes when taxes raise prices by $0.37. At the highest price
increase options we modelled, the MPL eliminates the consump-
tion gap, whereas the tax reduces it to 0.22 cigarettes per day.
Income-based disparities contract further if we assume that
lower income is associated with greater price sensitivity (panel
B), but the relative impact of MPLs versus taxes on disparities
remains. In this case, we predict that even an MPL set at a state
mean could eliminate the average consumption difference
between lower and higher income smokers, whereas under a
similar tax the difference shrinks to 0.15 cigarettes. At high
MPL and tax levels, both policies reverse the consumption gap.
DISCUSSION
This study is the first analysis designed to quantify the potential
impact of cigarette MPLs on smoking consumption, and
compare that to what we might expect from a tax increase
designed to raise average prices by the same amount. Our
results indicate that floor price MPLs that raise the cheapest
price one can pay for cigarettes can reduce overall consumption
more than comparable taxes. For example, an MPL that raises
prices by $0.33 on average produced a 4% decline in consump-
tion in our models, compared with a 2.3% decline in consump-
tion from a tax that raises prices by $0.37. An MPL that
produced a price increase of more than $2.00 was projected to
result in a 16% decline in consumption, compared with a
13.5% drop for a corresponding tax increase.
Furthermore, our results indicate that while both policies might
reduce income-based smoking disparities, MPLs may have more
potential as proequity tobacco control policies. At every MPL and
comparable tax level we modelled, MPLs produced larger con-
sumption reductions among lower income smokers than taxes did.
If lower income smokers are more price sensitive than higher
income smokers, even a relatively low MPL set at the average price
reported by cigarette buyers in a state could eliminate the per
capita consumption gap. To achieve a similar outcome, a tax
would need to raise average prices by almost twice as much.
The prices that TUS smokers report paying shed light on why
we observe these results. Economic theory predicts that con-
sumer responses to price changes depend on the amount of the
price increase relative to the original price paid.15 Lower
income smokers in the TUS reported paying an average of
$0.32 less for a pack of cigarettes compared with higher income
smokers. Any price policy, even a tax that levies the same spe-
cific price hike on all smokers, reduces smoking more among
the people previously paying the least, because the increase is
relatively larger on cheaper prices. Consumption should decline
more among people originally paying that rate. An MPL,
however, also produces a larger absolute price increase on those
smokers previously paying the least, which in turn produces an
even higher relative price hike. Our results reflect this; at all
price policy levels, relative price changes were substantially
higher for lower income smokers under the MPL policy than
Table 1 Smoking behaviours reported by TUS participants
All Lower income Higher income
n/mean Per cent/SD n/mean Per cent/SD n/mean Per cent/SD
Total TUS sample 170 469 – 89 293 – 81 176 –
Non-smokers 142 858 83.8% 70 740 79.2% 72 118 88.8%
Smokers 27 611 16.2% 18 553 20.8% 9058 11.2%
Analytic sample of smokers 23 524 – 15 803 – 7721 –
Smoking frequency
Every day 19 283 82.0% 13 081 82.8% 13 081 19.7%
Some days 5640 18.0% 2722 17.2% 1519 80.3%
Number of cigarettes smoked per day 13.21 9.02 13.34 9.07 12.96 8.92
Self-reported price paid for last pack $5.20 1.71 $5.10 1.74 $5.42 1.65
Lower income=household income <$50 000; higher income=household income ≥$50 000.
TUS, Tobacco Use Supplement.
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Table 2 MPL level and tax rate options by state
Option 1: MPL=75%
of state mean
Option 2: MPL=100%
of state mean
Option 3: MPL=125%
of state mean
Option 4: MPL=150%
of state mean
MPL level Tax increase MPL level Tax increase MPL level Tax increase MPL level Tax increase
Alabama $3.22 $0.04 $4.29 $0.37 $5.37 $1.14 $6.44 $2.19
Alaska $5.51 $0.10 $7.34 $0.54 $9.18 $1.89 $11.02 $3.69
Arizona $4.22 $0.20 $5.63 $0.64 $7.03 $1.54 $8.44 $2.84
Arkansas $3.59 $0.08 $4.79 $0.42 $5.99 $1.26 $7.19 $2.42
California $3.88 $0.08 $5.18 $0.43 $6.47 $1.39 $7.76 $2.64
Colorado $3.59 $0.04 $4.79 $0.34 $5.99 $1.24 $7.19 $2.41
Connecticut $5.52 $0.12 $7.36 $0.46 $9.20 $1.86 $11.03 $3.68
Delaware $3.74 $0.06 $4.99 $0.33 $6.23 $1.26 $7.48 $2.49
District of Columbia $5.05 $0.10 $6.74 $0.47 $8.42 $1.71 $10.11 $3.37
Florida $3.62 $0.10 $4.82 $0.48 $6.03 $1.31 $7.23 $2.45
Georgia $3.15 $0.05 $4.20 $0.35 $5.25 $1.10 $6.29 $2.11
Hawaii $5.41 $0.14 $7.21 $0.59 $9.01 $1.88 $10.81 $3.61
Idaho $3.19 $0.05 $4.26 $0.36 $5.32 $1.10 $6.39 $2.13
Illinois $3.92 $0.07 $5.22 $0.48 $6.53 $1.50 $7.84 $2.68
Indiana $3.44 $0.07 $4.58 $0.35 $5.73 $1.17 $6.88 $2.30
Iowa $3.81 $0.13 $5.08 $0.43 $6.35 $1.34 $7.62 $2.55
Kansas $3.42 $0.18 $4.56 $0.54 $5.70 $1.31 $6.84 $2.38
Kentucky $2.90 $0.07 $3.87 $0.39 $4.83 $1.04 $5.80 $1.95
Louisiana $3.26 $0.05 $4.34 $0.35 $5.43 $1.13 $6.51 $2.19
Maine $4.46 $0.16 $5.94 $0.51 $7.43 $1.55 $8.91 $3.01
Maryland $4.46 $0.08 $5.94 $0.39 $7.43 $1.50 $8.91 $2.97
Massachusetts $5.42 $0.14 $7.23 $0.58 $9.04 $1.90 $10.85 $3.68
Michigan $4.22 $0.23 $5.63 $0.52 $7.03 $1.48 $8.44 $2.86
Minnesota $3.89 $0.07 $5.19 $0.33 $6.48 $1.34 $7.78 $2.62
Mississippi $3.27 $0.06 $4.36 $0.35 $5.44 $1.12 $6.53 $2.19
Missouri $2.63 $0.10 $3.50 $0.42 $4.38 $0.98 $5.25 $1.77
Montana $4.09 $0.05 $5.45 $0.33 $6.82 $1.37 $8.18 $2.73
Nebraska $3.31 $0.07 $4.41 $0.40 $5.52 $1.15 $6.62 $2.21
Nevada $3.53 $0.10 $4.70 $0.45 $5.88 $1.31 $7.05 $2.42
New Hampshire $4.11 $0.07 $5.48 $0.40 $6.84 $1.41 $8.21 $2.74
New Jersey $5.31 $0.15 $7.08 $0.47 $8.85 $1.81 $10.62 $3.55
New Mexico $4.01 $0.23 $5.34 $0.69 $6.68 $1.62 $8.02 $2.88
New York $5.41 $0.71 $7.21 $1.33 $9.01 $2.31 $10.81 $3.73
North Carolina $3.14 $0.06 $4.18 $0.38 $5.23 $1.10 $6.27 $2.11
North Dakota $3.11 $0.06 $4.15 $0.34 $5.19 $1.10 $6.23 $2.12
Ohio $3.77 $0.08 $5.02 $0.35 $6.28 $1.29 $7.53 $2.52
Oklahoma $3.36 $0.09 $4.49 $0.43 $5.61 $1.19 $6.73 $2.26
Oregon $3.64 $0.06 $4.86 $0.34 $6.07 $1.26 $7.29 $2.44
Pennsylvania $4.07 $0.08 $5.43 $0.43 $6.79 $1.43 $8.15 $2.76
Rhode Island $5.57 $0.25 $7.42 $0.56 $9.28 $1.88 $11.13 $3.72
South Carolina $3.04 $0.06 $4.05 $0.38 $5.06 $1.05 $6.08 $2.03
South Dakota $4.01 $0.09 $5.35 $0.36 $6.69 $1.36 $8.03 $2.68
Tennessee $3.03 $0.02 $4.04 $0.35 $5.05 $1.06 $6.06 $2.03
Texas $3.98 $0.10 $5.31 $0.43 $6.63 $1.38 $7.96 $2.68
Utah $4.01 $0.09 $5.34 $0.46 $6.68 $1.41 $8.02 $2.68
Vermont $5.05 $0.10 $6.73 $0.47 $8.42 $1.74 $10.10 $3.40
Virginia $3.16 $0.08 $4.21 $0.40 $5.26 $1.13 $6.31 $2.13
Washington $5.33 $0.31 $7.10 $0.83 $8.88 $2.01 $10.65 $3.71
West Virginia $2.88 $0.02 $3.84 $0.30 $4.80 $1.01 $5.76 $1.93
Wisconsin $4.81 $0.08 $6.41 $0.42 $8.01 $1.62 $9.61 $3.20
Wyoming $3.29 $0.05 $4.39 $0.37 $5.48 $1.14 $6.58 $2.19
Average $3.90 $0.11 $5.20 $0.46 $6.50 $1.38 $7.80 $2.63
MPL, minimum price law.
Golden SD, et al. Tob Control 2016;25:i60–i66. doi:10.1136/tobaccocontrol-2016-053230 i63
Research paper
they were for higher income smokers under the MPL, or any
smokers under the tax. In addition, the initial $0.32 difference
in average prices reported by lower versus higher income
smokers drops to $0.23–$0.26 for MPLs set at state mean
prices or above, but remains relatively constant under all tax
options (results not shown).
We modelled total change in cigarette consumption, which
likely occurs from some people reducing the amount they
smoke, as well as others quitting smoking altogether. In the
TUS, smoking prevalence was nearly twice as high among lower
income respondents than higher income respondents. Although
the policies we model reduced or even eliminated the per capita
cigarette consumption disparity among smokers, the original
prevalence disparity would likely shrink but not disappear.
Assuming consistent price elasticity, MPLs set at the mean state
price are projected to reduce per capita daily consumption
among the 15 803 lower income smokers by 0.60 cigarettes per
day and among the 7721 higher income smokers by 0.37 cigar-
ettes. The parallel tax projections are 0.32 and 0.29, respect-
ively. Based on original daily consumption averages of 13.34
(lower income) and 12.96 (higher income), and previous studies
that suggest that about one-half of reductions in total cigarette
consumption result from smokers quitting all together,25 27 28 it
could be reasonable to expect about 2.2% of lower income
smokers and 1.4% of higher income smokers to quit in the
MPL scenario, compared with 1.1% of smokers from each
income group in the tax scenario. This translates to 466 TUS
smokers quitting under the MPL, compared with only 264
under the tax.
In addition to their promise for shrinking disparities, floor
price MPLs may have other advantages as price policies. Many
of the MPLs currently adopted in US states employ complex
mark-up schemes, rather than a floor price, and permit dis-
counting.8 As a result, these MPLs appear ineffective at raising
prices, and are likely difficult to enforce because the legal allow-
able price is not simple to discern. Floor prices, in contrast, are
more straightforward, which simplifies enforcement and limits
illicit trade. Yet, MPLs also have some drawbacks. For those
low-income smokers who maintain their consumptions levels,
pricing policies add financial strain to their budgets, and this
strain is the greatest for those who experience a large relative
price increase, as is more likely under an MPL. Smokers may
want to quit rather than face these costs, but have a particularly
difficult time doing so.29 30 Another potential downside of
MPLs is that they may raise profits for the tobacco industry that
could be shifted to marketing or other efforts to grow their con-
sumer base.6
A comprehensive approach to tobacco pricing policy that
relies on excise taxes and floor price MPLs may be the strongest
approach. Combining MPLs with tax policies may ensure that
prices are raised on premium products as well as discount
brands, while maintaining the disproportionate effect at the
cheaper end of the market we find to be associated with redu-
cing disparities. Furthermore, if MPLs are implemented with
high excise taxes that are included in the minimum price level,
the ‘profits’ from the MPL could go to state governments in the
form of taxes. This approach is similar to two policies consid-
ered in other countries, but less familiar to policymakers in the
USA: a minimum specific excise tax which disproportionately
raises taxes on cheaper products,31 32 and a price cap and tax
policy that sets a maximum price a retailer can charge and adds
a large excise tax to raise consumer prices.33 Finally, pairing
both MPLs and taxes with provision of accessible, free or
low-cost cessation services may enhance the effectiveness of the
policy, and minimise the extent to which it places additional
burdens on already vulnerable groups.34
As with any predictive modelling, our results are heavily
dependent on the assumptions we employ. In particular, we
assume that 15% of smokers will respond to increased prices by
seeking out opportunities to avoid the new prices. MPL price
analyses in Malaysia35 and New York City,36 however, indicate
that the per cent of illicit (or below minimum price) sales only
increased by 3–5 percentage points following policy implemen-
tation, suggesting we may have underestimated the modelled
policies’ impact on prices. In reality, the amount of policy avoid-
ance will likely vary by state, based in part on differences in
prices in, and distances to, nearby cigarette markets,37 38 and by
income levels, smoking intensity and self-reported price levels
prepolicy. The people likely to be more deeply affected by an
MPL than by a tax (those paying and earning the least) may also
Figure 1 Relative price increases
projected for each policy option by
income. API, average price increase;
MPL, minimum price law.
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be more motivated to evade an MPL than a tax, which might
diminish the relative impact of the MPL. Finally, we focus this
analysis on cigarette consumption, but it is possible that changes
in cigarette prices following MPLs or taxes could prompt
smokers to switch to another tobacco product, like little cigars39
or e-cigarettes,40 or use loose tobacco,41 rather than quit or
reduce tobacco use.
In addition to these assumptions about consumers, our mod-
elling does not account for how retailers or the industry might
respond to an MPL or tax. Empirical research, as well as eco-
nomic theories of price setting in oligopolistic markets, indicates
that the industry either overshifts all of its taxes, so that all
prices go up by more than the tax amount,42 43 or primarily
shifts a tax burden to premium products, raising prices on those
products disproportionately in order to keep the prices of dis-
count brands cheap.15 44–46 If the excise taxes we analysed were
overshifted across all products, we may have underestimated the
rise in prices for all products and the associated reductions in
overall consumption for this policy. If, however, taxes were dis-
proportionately shifted for higher priced products, we may have
underestimated the rise in prices on expensive products, but
actually overestimated the rise in prices on cheap purchases. In
this scenario, we might observe a smaller tax-associated reduc-
tion in income-based disparities than modelled. Whether price
shifting would occur with an MPL, and how, is unknown. By its
nature, an MPL prevents the industry from keeping low-priced
products cheap. If the industry generates sufficient profits on
these products to offset losses due to reduced consumption gen-
erated by the MPL, the incentive to price shift at all may be
more limited than under a tax scenario. If an MPL is levied in
conjunction with an excise tax, however, the industry might still
raise prices on premium products. Researchers should collect
empirical data about product-specific price shifts in jurisdictions
that have implemented a floor price MPL to build dynamic
models of the potential impact of MPLs in a tobacco market
system.47 48
Although specific excise taxes have long been the price policy
of choice in the USA, the analyses we present here suggest that a
floor price style of MPL may be more effective at reducing cig-
arette consumption, especially among low-income smokers.
Specifically, our results indicate that flat rate state MPLs, if set at
or above the average pack price reported by smokers in that
state, can reduce smoker’s cigarette consumption by 67% more
than corresponding taxes. By specifically targeting cheap prices
more frequently reported by low-income smokers, MPLs may
also be well positioned to reduce income-based smoking dispar-
ities, especially if implemented in conjunction with other price
policies and low-cost cessation services.
What this paper adds
Previous research on relatively weak or poorly structured
minimum price laws (MPLs) may not reveal their potential as
tobacco control strategies. Using nationally representative data
about smoking behaviour and prices smokers report paying for
cigarettes, this study projects the impact that stronger MPLs
could have on prices and cigarette consumption, and compares
them to excise taxes designed to raise average prices by similar
amounts. Contrary to the limited previous work indicating weak
associations between existing MPLs and prices, we predict that
MPLs with floor prices set at or above average state prices could
reduce disparities in the prices low-income and high-income
smokers report paying for cigarettes, as well as the cigarettes
they consume, and shows promise as a proequity tobacco
control policy.
Contributors SDG conceived the study idea, conducted primary analyses and
drafted the final paper. MCF, DAL and KMR assisted with analyses, provided input
into the interpretation and discussion of the results, and edited manuscript drafts.
All authors reviewed and approved the final version of the manuscript.
Funding National Cancer Institute. Grant number U01 CA154281.
Competing interests KMR is the Chair of the Board of Directors of Counter Tools
(http://countertools.org), a non-profit from which he receives compensation. Counter
Tools provides technical assistance on point of sale tobacco control issues and
distributes store mapping and store audit tools. KMR also has a royalty interest in a
store mapping and audit system owned by the University of North Carolina at
Chapel Hill but these systems were not used in this study.
Provenance and peer review Not commissioned; externally peer reviewed.
Data sharing statement This study is based on publicly available data.
Open Access This is an Open Access article distributed in accordance with the
Creative Commons Attribution Non Commercial (CC BY-NC 4.0) license, which
permits others to distribute, remix, adapt, build upon this work non-commercially,
and license their derivative works on different terms, provided the original work is
properly cited and the use is non-commercial. See: http://creativecommons.org/
licenses/by-nc/4.0/
REFERENCES
1 Jamal AH, David M, O’Connor E, et al. Current cigarette smoking among
adults—United States, 2005–2014. MMWR Morb Mortal Wkly Rep
2015;64:1233–40.
Figure 2 Projected changes in per capita daily cigarette consumption
by income. MPL, minimum price law; TUS, Tobacco Use Supplement.
Golden SD, et al. Tob Control 2016;25:i60–i66. doi:10.1136/tobaccocontrol-2016-053230 i65
Research paper
2 Contreary KA, Chattopadhyay SK, Hopkins DP, et al. Economic impact of tobacco
price increases through taxation: a community guide systematic review. Am J Prev
Med 2015;49:800–8.
3 Chaloupka FJ, Straif K, Leon ME. Effectiveness of tax and price policies in tobacco
control. Tob Control 2011;20:235–8.
4 Brown T, Platt S, Amos A. Equity impact of interventions and policies to reduce
smoking in youth: systematic review. Tob Control 2014;23:e98–105.
5 Hill S, Amos A, Clifford D, et al. Impact of tobacco control interventions on
socioeconomic inequalities in smoking: review of the evidence. Tob Control
2014;23:e89–97.
6 Golden SD, Smith MH, Feighery EC, et al. Beyond excise taxes: a systematic review
of literature on non-tax policy approaches to raising tobacco product prices. Tob
Control 2016;25:377–85.
7 Lange T, Hoefges M, Ribisl KM. Regulating tobacco product advertising and
promotions in the retail environment: a roadmap for states and localities. J Law
Med Ethics 2015;43:878–96.
8 Tynan MA, Ribisl KM, Loomis BR. Impact of cigarette minimum price laws on the
retail price of cigarettes in the USA. Tob Control 2013;22:e78–85.
9 Feighery EC, Ribisl KM, Schleicher NC, et al. How do minimum cigarette price laws
affect cigarette prices at the retail level? Tob Control 2005;14:80–5.
10 McLaughlin I, Pearson A, Laird-Metke E, et al. Reducing tobacco use and access
through strengthened minimum price laws. Am J Public Health 2014;104:1844–50.
11 Cornelius ME, Driezen P, Fong GT, et al. Trends in the use of premium and discount
cigarette brands: findings from the ITC US Surveys (2002–2011). Tob Control
2014;23(Suppl 1):i48–53.
12 Xu X, Wang X, Caraballo RS. Is every smoker interested in price promotions? An
evaluation of price-related discounts by cigarette brands. J Public Health Manag
Pract 2016;22:20–8.
13 Xu X, Pesko MF, Tynan MA, et al. Cigarette price-minimization strategies by U.S.
smokers. Am J Prev Med 2013;44:472–6.
14 Callison K, Kaestner R. Do higher tobacco taxes reduce adult smoking? New evidence of
the effect of recent cigarette tax increases on adult smoking. Econ Inq 2014;52:155–72.
15 Chaloupka FJ, Warner KE. The economics of smoking. Handb Health Econ
2000;1:1539–627.
16 Gallet CA, List JA. Cigarette demand: a meta-analysis of elasticities. Health Econ
2003;12:821–35.
17 Maclean JC, Kessler AS, Kenkel DS. Cigarette taxes and older adult smoking:
evidence from the health and retirement study. Health Econ 2015;4:424–38.
18 Tauras JA. Smoke-free air laws, cigarette prices, and adult cigarette demand. Econ
Inq 2006;44:333–42.
19 US Department of Commerce, C.B. National Cancer Institute-sponsored Tobacco
Use Supplement to the Current Population Survey (2010–11). 2012.
http://appliedresearch.cancer.gov/tus-cps/. Data files and technical documentation.
http://thedataweb.rm.census.gov/ftp/cps_ftp.html#cpssupps
20 ScheuermannTS, Mburu WE, Mathur C, et al. Correlates of converted and native
nondaily smoking. Nicotine Tob Res 2015;17:1112–19.
21 Hassmiller KM, Warner KE, Mendez D, et al. Nondaily smokers: who are they? Am
J Public Health 2003;93:1321–7.
22 Noss A. Household income for states: 2009 and 2010. US Department of
Commerce, Economics and Statistics Administration, US Census Bureau, 2011.
23 National Research Council. Understanding the U.S. Illicit Tobacco Market:
characteristics, policy context, and lessons from international experiences.
Washington DC: The National Academies Press, 2015.
24 Colman GJ, Remler DK. Vertical equity consequences of very high cigarette tax
increases: If the poor are the ones smoking, how could cigarette tax increases be
progressive? J Policy Anal Manage 2008;27:376–400.
25 Farrelly MC, Bray JW, Pechacek T, et al. Response by adults to increases in cigarette
prices by sociodemographic characteristics. South Econ J 2001;68:156–65.
26 Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). Response to increases in
cigarette prices by race/ethnicity, income, and age groups—United States, 1976–
1993. MMWR Morb Mortal Wkly Rep 1998;47:605–9.
27 Lewit EM, Coate D. The potential for using excise taxes to reduce smoking. J Health
Econ 1982;1:121–45.
28 Chaloupka FJ, Yurekli A, Fong GT. Tobacco taxes as a tobacco control strategy.
Tob Control 2012;21:172–80.
29 Kendzor DE, Businelle MS, Costello TJ, et al. Financial strain and smoking
cessation among racially/ethnically diverse smokers. Am J Public Health
2010;100:702–6.
30 Siahpush M, Yong HH, Borland R, et al. Smokers with financial stress are more
likely to want to quit but less likely to try or succeed: findings from the International
Tobacco Control (ITC) Four Country Survey. Addiction 2009;104:1382–90.
31 World Health Organization. WHO technical manual on tobacco tax administration.
World Health Organization, 2010.
32 Chaloupka FJ, Kostova D, Shang C. Cigarette excise tax structure and cigarette
prices: evidence from the Global Adult Tobacco Survey and the US National Adult
Tobacco Survey. Nicotine Tob Res 2014;16:S3–9.
33 Gilmore AB, Branston JR, Sweanor D. The case for OFSMOKE: how tobacco price
regulation is needed to promote the health of markets, government revenue and
the public. Tob Control 2010;19:423–30.
34 Frohlich KL, Potvin L. Transcending the known in public health practice: the
inequality paradox: the population approach and vulnerable populations. Am
J Public Health 2008;98:216–21.
35 Liber AC, Ross H, Omar M, et al. The impact of the Malaysian minimum cigarette
price law: findings from the ITC Malaysia Survey. Tob Control 2015;24(Suppl 3):
iii83–7.
36 Silver D, Macinko J, Giorgio M, et al. Retailer compliance with tobacco control laws
in New York City before and after raising the minimum legal purchase age to 21.
Tob Control Published Online First: 19 Nov 2015. doi:10.1136/tobaccocontrol-
2015-052547
37 DeCicca P, Kenkel D, Liu F. Excise tax avoidance: the case of state cigarette taxes.
J Health Econ 2013;32:1130–41.
38 Hyland A, Bauer JE, Li Q, et al. Higher cigarette prices influence cigarette purchase
patterns. Tob Control 2005;14:86–92.
39 Gammon DG, Loomis BR, Dench DL, et al. Effect of price changes in little cigars
and cigarettes on little cigar sales: USA, Q4 2011-Q4 2013. Tob Control
2016;25:538–44.
40 Grace RC, Kivell BM, Laugesen M. Estimating cross-price elasticity of e-cigarettes
using a simulated demand procedure. Nicotine Tob Res 2015;17:592–8.
41 White JS, Ross H. Smokers’ strategic responses to sin taxes: evidence from panel
data in Thailand. Health Econ 2015;24:127–41.
42 Keeler TE, Hu TW, Barnett PG, et al. Do cigarette producers price-discriminate by
state? An empirical analysis of local cigarette pricing and taxation. J Health Econ
1996;15:499–512.
43 Brock B, Choi K, Boyle RG, et al. Tobacco product prices before and after a
statewide tobacco tax increase. Tob Control 2016;25:166–73.
44 Marsh L, Cameron C, Quigg R, et al. The impact of an increase in excise tax on the
retail price of tobacco in New Zealand. Tob Control 2016;25:458–63.
45 Brock B, Schillo BA, Moilanen M. Tobacco industry marketing: an analysis of direct
mail coupons and giveaways. Tob Control 2015;24:505–8.
46 Gilmore AB, Tavakoly B, Taylor G, et al. Understanding tobacco industry pricing
strategy and whether it undermines tobacco tax policy: the example of the UK
cigarette market. Addiction 2013;108:1317–26.
47 Institute of Medicine. Assessing the use of agent-based models for tobacco
regulation. Washington DC: The National Academies Press, 2015.
48 Luke DA, Stamatakis KA. Systems science methods in public health: dynamics,
networks, and agents. Annu Rev Public Health 2012;33:357–76.
i66 Golden SD, et al. Tob Control 2016;25:i60–i66. doi:10.1136/tobaccocontrol-2016-053230
Research paper
